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Abstract
We investigate the containment of epidemic spreading in networks from a nor-
mative point of view. We consider a susceptible/infected model in which agents can
invest in order to reduce the contagiousness of network links. In this setting, we
study the relationships between social efficiency, individual behaviours and network
structure. First, we exhibit an upper bound on the Price of Anarchy and prove that
the level of inefficiency can scale up to linearly with the number of agents. Second,
we prove that policies of uniform reduction of interactions satisfy some optimal-
ity conditions in a vast range of networks. In setting where no central authority
can enforce such stringent policies, we consider as a type of second-best policy the
shift from a local to a global game by allowing agents to subsidise investments in
contagiousness reduction in the global rather than in the local network. We then
characterise the scope for Pareto improvement opened by such policies through a
notion of Price of Autarky, measuring the ratio between social welfare at a global
and a local equilibrium. Overall, our results show that individual behaviours can
be extremely inefficient in the face of epidemic propagation but that policy can
take advantage of the network structure to design efficient containment policies.
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1 Introduction
Limiting epidemic spreading is today’s key policy concern in the context of the COVID-
19 pandemic. Beyond diseases, a number of socio-economic bads diffuse through social
networks via epidemic-like processes, e.g., financial distress or fake news. However, there
is, to our knowledge, no normative analysis of the challenges posed by the containment
of epidemic spreading. This is the issue we address in this paper.
The containment of epidemic processes defines a specific class of externality prob-
lems: through prophylactic investment, agents can reduce their own contamination risk
but also reduce the risk of contagion of their peers in the network. The external effect
hence created has certain features of a public good as the investment of each agent
benefits to all the agents to whom it is connected. However, the magnitude of the effect
depends on the specific connectivity between each pair of agents and thus on the struc-
ture of the network. In this setting, we aim to characterise, as a function of the network
structure, (i) socially optimal containment policies, (ii) inefficiencies induced by indi-
vidual strategic behaviours, and (iii) the type of measures that can be implemented to
overcome these inefficiencies.
We place ourselves in a setting where the network structure is given, each agent
can be initially contaminated with a certain probability, and contagion spreads through
network links proportionally to their contagiousness. Once infected, agents remain
so permanently, i.e. we consider a susceptible/infected type of model according to the
epidemiological terminology. In this context, agents aim at minimising their probability
of contagion before a given date. In a narrow interpretation, this date can be seen as the
expected date at which a treatment will be available. In a broader sense, the objective
of each individual is to reduce the speed of incoming epidemic propagation. We assume
that agents can invest in the network to reduce the speed of contagion. More precisely,
they can decrease the contagiousness of links at a fixed linear cost. As the impact of
individual investments depends on global contagiousness, and hence on the investment
of other players, the situation defines a non-cooperative game. We consider two variants
of the game. The local game in which an agent can only invest in the links through
which it is connected. The global game in which an agent can invest in each link of the
network. The local game naturally applies to settings where agents are individuals that
can take individual and costly measures to limit their social interactions. The global
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game corresponds to a more complex setting where agents are usually organisations
(regions, countries) that are involved in a scheme that allows one agent to subsidise,
directly or indirectly, the investment of other agents in the reduction of contagiousness.
Our main results characterise the relationships between social efficiency, individual
behaviours and network structure. First, we derive an upper bound on the Price of
Anarchy (PoA). We show that in worst cases the level of inefficiency can scale up to
linearly with the number of agents. This strongly calls for public policy interventions.
In this respect, we study the optimality of a policy of uniform reduction of interactions,
akin to social distancing measures put in place during the COVID-19 pandemic, in a
wide range of networks. This latter result provides normative foundations for the social
distancing policies implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic. The implementation
of such policies nevertheless requires the existence of an authority with sufficient legit-
imacy to implement such coercive measures. It can be thus implemented in a domestic
context but is much harder to implement at the global scale, unless all agents/countries
have individual incentives to do so. If this is not the case, we regard the shift from
a local to a global game as a type of second-best policy. In the latter game, agents
can subsidise investments towards contagiousness diminution in the global rather than
in the local network. The scope for Pareto improvement generated by such policies is
then characterised through a notion of Price of Autarky (PoK), which assesses the ratio
between social welfare at a global and a local equilibrium. We derive a lower bound
on this PoK as a function of the network structure and thus give sufficient conditions
under which a shift to the global game actually induces a Pareto improvement. Over-
all, the results derived not only underline the possible extreme inefficiency of individual
behaviours to limit epidemic propagation, but also the potential for policies to benefit
from the network structure to design efficient containment policies.
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 introduces epidemic dynamics as well as our behavioural model
of the containment of epidemic spreading. Section 4 provides our main results on
the relationship between individual behaviours, social efficiency and network structure.
Section 5 introduces the notion of PoK and applies it to our setting. Section 6 concludes.
An appendix with the proofs of the main results is provided.
3
2 Related literature
The paper builds on the very large literature on the optimal design and defense of net-
works (see, e.g., Bravard et al. (2017)) and on epidemic spreading in networks. The
latter literature has been extensively reviewed in Pastor-Satorras et al. (2015) and gen-
erally combines an epidemiological model with a diffusion model. The epidemiological
model describes the characteristics of the disease via the set of states each agent can
assume, e.g., susceptible/infected (SI), susceptible/infected/susceptible (SIS), suscep-
tible/infected/removed (SIR), and the probabilities of transition between these. The
diffusion model considers that the set of agents is embedded in a network structure
through which the disease spreads in a stochastic manner. Overall, the micro-level
epidemic diffusion model is a continuous-time Markov chain model whose state space
corresponds to the complete epidemiological status of the population. This state space
is however too large for the full model to be computationally or analytically tractable.
A large strand of the literature has thus focused on the development of good approxima-
tions of the dynamics, see, e.g., Chakrabarti et al. (2008); Draief et al. (2006); Ganesh
et al. (2005); Mei et al. (2017); Prakash et al. (2012); Ruhi et al. (2016); Van Mieghem
et al. (2009); Wang et al. (2003). To the best of our knowledge, the most precise ap-
proximation of the dynamics in the SIS/SIR setting is the N´ intertwined model of
Van Mieghem et al. (2009). This model uses one (mean-field) approximation in the
exact SIS model to convert the exact model into a set of N non-linear differential equa-
tions. This transformation allows analytic computations that remain impossible with
other more precise SIS models and renders the model relevant for any arbitrary graph.
The N´ intertwined model upper bounds the exact model for finite networks of size
N and its accuracy improves with N . Van Mieghem and Omic (2008) have extended
the model to the heterogeneous case where the infection and curing rates depend on
the node. Later, Van Mieghem (2013) has analytically derived the decay rate of SIS
epidemics on a complete graph, while Van Mieghem (2014) has proposed an exact
Markovian SIS and SIR epidemics on networks together with an upper bound for the
epidemic threshold.
Most of this literature has focused on SIS/SIR models in which there exists an epi-
demic threshold above which the disease spreads exponentially. A key concern has thus
been the approximation of the epidemic threshold as a function of the characteristics
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of the network, and subsequently the determination of immunisation policies that al-
low to reach the below-the-threshold regime (see, e.g., Chen et al. (2016, 2015); Holme
et al. (2002); Preciado et al. (2013, 2014); Saha et al. (2015); Schneider et al. (2011);
Van Mieghem et al. (2011)).
A handful of studies has adopted a normative approach to the issue using a game-
theoretic setting. Omic et al. (2009) consider a N´intertwined SIS epidemic model,
in which agents can invest in their curing rate. They prove the existence of a Nash
Equilibrium and derive its characteristics as a function of the network structure. They
provide a measure of social efficiency through the PoA. They also investigate two types
of policies to reduce contagiousness. The first one plays with the influence of the relative
prices of protection while the second one relies on the enforcement of an upper bound
on infection probabilities. Hayel et al. (2014) have also analysed decentralised optimal
protection strategies in a SIS epidemic model. However, in their case, the curing and
infection rates are fixed and each node can either invest in an antivirus to be fully
protected or invest in a recovery software once infected. They show that the game is
a potential one, expressed the pure Nash Equilibrium for a single community/fully-
mesh network in a closed form, and establish the existence and uniqueness of a mixed
Nash Equilibrium. They also provide a characterisation of the PoA. Finally, Goyal
and Vigier (2015) examine, in a two-period model, the trade-off faced by individuals
between reducing interaction and buying protection, and its impacts on infection rates.
They analyse the equilibrium levels of interaction and protection as well as the infection
rate of the population, and show the existence of a unique equilibrium. They highlight
that individuals investing in protection are more willing to interact than those who do
not invest, and establish the non-monotonic effects of changes in the contagiousness of
a disease.
Yet, most of these contributions focus on situations where (i) some form of vaccine or
treatment is available and (ii) dynamics are of the SIS/SIR type. Our attention is rather
on situations where there is no known cure to the epidemic and where the objective
is to delay its propagation through investments in the reduction of contagiousness.
Therefore, we focus on the transient dynamics of the SI model. In this respect, we build
on the recent contribution of Lee et al. (2019) who provide an analytical framework to
represent the transient dynamics of the SI epidemic dynamics on an arbitrary network.
In particular, they derive a tight approximation in closed-form of the solution to the SI
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epidemic dynamics over all time t. The latter overcomes the shortfalls of the existing
linearised approximation (see Canright and Engø-Monsen (2006); Mei et al. (2017);
Newman (2010)) by means of a thorough mathematical transformation of the system
governing the SI dynamics. Lee et al. (2019) have also derived vaccination policies
to mitigate the risks of potential attacks or minimise the consequences of an existing
epidemic spread with a limited number of available patches or vaccines over the network.
From an economic perspective, our contribution relates to the growing literature on
the private provision of public goods on network. This literature mostly focuses on the
relationship between the network structure and the individual provision of public goods.
It generally considers a fixed network and that the public good/effort provision of an
agent only affects its neighbors. In particular, Allouch (2015) shows the existence of a
Nash Equilibrium in this setting under very general conditions. Bramoulle´ and Kran-
ton (2007) prove, in a more specific setting, that Nash Equilibria generically have a
specialised structure in which some individuals contribute and others free ride. A more
recent contribution by Kinateder and Merlino (2017) extends the models of private pro-
vision of public goods to a setting with an endogenous network formation process. Yet,
the network is formed in view of the benefits provided by the public good/effort offered
by connections. Hence, although related, our focus differs from this strand of literature
as, in our setting, the process of link formation per se is the source of external effects,
and effects propagate throughout the network. Another related contribution is Elliott
and Golub (2019), which provides a more conceptual view on the relationship between
the network structure and public goods. It focuses on the network of external effects
per se and characterises efficient cooperation/bargaining institutions in this framework.
Our model could be subsumed into an extended version of their model which considers
multi-dimensional actions. However, their framework abstracts away from the process
underlying the interactions, which is one of our key focus.
3 The model
3.1 Notations
We consider N the set of natural numbers andN P N. The notationMN (resp. MN pR`q)
denotes the set of N´dimensional square matrices with coefficients in R (resp. R`).
For a given M PMN , we write pMqi,j or mi,j , 1 ď i, j ď N , to refer to its element in the
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ith´row and jth´column. Moreover, for any M PMN , ||M || denotes its Frobenius norm
and for any matrix M and K in MN ˆMN , we write M ď K if mi,j ď ki,j , @i, j “
1, ..., N . Additionally, the matrix I (resp. O) stands for the N´dimensional square
identity (resp. null) matrix.
Similarly, for a N´dimensional column vector u P RN , ui, 1 ď i ď N, refers to its
element in the ith´row while uJ denotes its transpose and ||u || its Euclidean norm.
Additionally, for any u and v in RN ˆ RN , we let u ĺ v if ui ď vi, @i “ 1, ..., N . We
define similarly u ă v . For a function f : R ÞÑ R and a vector u P RN , fpuq denotes
the N´dimensional column vector with fpuiq, 1 ď i ď N, as entries. Moreover, 1 is
the N´dimensional column vector with one as entries.
We also consider diagpuq, the N´dimensional square diagonal matrix with ui, 1 ď
i ď N, as diagonal entries. Additionally, for the ith´vector of the canonical basis of
RN , ei, 1 ď i ď N, and any matrix M PMN , we define the product operator
ă ei,M ą:“
˜
Nÿ
j“1
eij ˆmj,1, ...,
Nÿ
j“1
eij ˆmj,N
¸
,
a N´dimensional row vector.
We define SN (resp. SN pR`q) as the subset of elements of MN (resp. MN pR`q) that
are symmetric. We observe that SN is a real vector-space of dimension NpN ` 1q{2 and
we consider the basis formed by the matrices pBti,juq1ďiďjďN such that bti,jui,j “ bti,juj,i “ 1
and b
ti,ju
k,` “ 0 for tk, `u ­“ ti, ju. Accordingly, given a matrix D P SN , we let dtj,ku :“
dj,k ` dk,j . Moreover, given U Ď SN , a differentiable function φ : U Ñ R, and D¯ P U,
we denote by
Bφ
Bdti,ju pD¯q the partial derivative in the direction of B
ti,ju, that is
Bφ
Bdti,ju pD¯q :“
Bφ
Bdi,j pD¯q `
Bφ
Bdj,i pD¯q ,
where
Bφ
Bdi,j pD¯q and
Bφ
Bdj,i pD¯q denote the partial derivatives in the directions induced
by the canonical basis of MN .
Finally, for a set B, we note CardpBq its cardinal and pBqc the complementary set.
3.2 Model outline
We consider a finite set of agents, N “ t1, 2, ..., Nu, N ě 2, connected through a
weighted and undirected network. The set of links is given by E Ď tti, ju | i, j P N u
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and their weights by the weighted adjacency matrix A P SN pR`q. In particular, for all
i P E , aii “ 0. The agents face the risk of shifting from a good/susceptible state to
a bad/infected state. This transition occurs in continuous time through an epidemic
process over the network. At time zero, a subset of agents idiosyncratically shifts to the
infected state. Following this initial shock, infected agents contaminate their neighbours
in the network with a probability that is proportional to the weight of the corresponding
link. Infected agents remain so permanently and cannot revert to the susceptible state.
As intimated in Section 2, this model is known as the SI model in the epidemiological
literature (see, e.g., Pastor-Satorras et al. (2015)). It provides an accurate description of
epidemic dynamics at short time scale and/or when no vaccine or treatment is available
against the epidemic.
We consider a socio-economic setting in which strategic agents can invest in the
network in order to reduce contagion rates. We are concerned with the characterisation
of the equilibrium behaviour in this context, its relation to social efficiency, and the
potential impacts of policy on these features. Such setting captures the behaviour of
countries facing the global propagation of an epidemic as well as that of individuals
facing its local propagation. It can also be applied to other socio-economic context
such as the propagation of computer viruses (see, e.g., Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani
(2001)) or financial distress (see, e.g., Battiston et al. (2012)).
In order to formally define the model, we first provide a detailed description of
the epidemic dynamics and its approximation (see Section 3.3) and then introduce a
representation of agents’ prophylactic behaviours (see Section 3.4).
3.3 Epidemic dynamics
Formally, an exact model of the dynamics of epidemic spreading in the SI framework
is given by a continuous-time Markov chain pXptqqtě0 with state space X :“ t0, 1uN .
A state Xptq P X is defined by the combination of states of all the N agents at time
t and is thus described by the set of susceptible agents ti P N | Xiptq “ 0u and the
set of infected agents ti P N | Xiptq “ 1u. The key specificity of the dynamics of the
Markov chain pXptqqtě0 is the stochastic rate of contagion for a susceptible node i P N ,
characterising its transition probability as follows
lim
hÑ0
1
h
PrXipt` hq “ 1 | Xiptq “ 0s “ β
ÿ
jPN
ai,j1tXjptq“1u , (3.1)
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where β is a unit contagion rate, ai,j , i, j P N , is the contagiousness of the network
link ti, ju, and P denotes the probability on the underlying probability space. Equation
(3.1) characterises completely the dynamics, as infected nodes remain so permanently.
It highlights the role of the network in the contagion process and the possible heteroge-
neous contagiousness of different network links. In this respect, we make the following
assumption about the network structure throughout the paper.
Assumption 3.3.1. The adjacency matrix A P SN pR`q is irreducible and aperiodic.
The irreducibility assumption amounts to considering that every agent faces a risk
of contagion as soon as at least one agent in the network is infected. Indeed, the net-
work is then necessarily connected and the asymptotic behaviour of the Markov chain
is trivial: there is an unstable steady state where none of the agent is infected and a
unique stable steady state where all agents are contaminated1. In the following, we
shall actually consider that agents are concerned by the time at which they are likely
to be infected rather than by their asymptotic infection status. Accordingly, we are
concerned with the transient behaviour of the Markov chain. However, as intimated
above, the infection rate defined by the right-hand side of Equation (3.1) is a random
variable, making the process doubly stochastic. The random nature of the infection
rate could then be offset by conditioning with respect to all the possible combinations
of the neighbouring states, i.e. Xjptq, j ‰ i. Yet, such conditioning of every node
would lead to a Markov chain with 2N states, i.e. with a number of states increasing
exponentially with the number of nodes, and thus being neither analytically nor compu-
tationally tractable. Therefore, the conventional practice in epidemiological modelling
is to consider a mean-field approximation of the infection rate. In particular, the N -
intertwined model of Van Mieghem et al. (2009) considers the average behaviour, i.e.
the expectation, over states for the infection rate. Therefrom, the latter model derives
an approximate dynamics of the probability for an agent i P N to be in the infected
state at time t given by xiptq :“ PrXiptq “ 1s2. More precisely, using the fact that
PrXiptq “ 1s ` PrXiptq “ 0s “ 1 and the total law of probability, one gets from Equa-
1Stability must be understood in the sense that, for any initial non-null probability distribution, the
limiting distribution of the Markov chain has full support on the full contamination state.
2Let Ti :“ inftt ě 0 : Xiptq “ 1u valued in R`. We observe that for t ě 0, xiptq “ PrTi ď ts.
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tion (3.1) that for all i P N ,
Bxiptq
Bt “ p1´ xiptqqβ
Nÿ
j“1
ai,jxjptq . (3.2)
Equation (3.2) thus provides a deterministic approximation of the dynamics of the
contagion probability that takes into account the full network structure. It neverthe-
less disregards the positive correlation between the infection status of neighbouring
nodes. This implies that Equation (3.2) over-estimates the probability of contagion
(see Van Mieghem et al. (2009)).
Remark 3.1. Alternative mean-field approximations used in the literature are generally
much coarser that the N -intertwined model considered here. Two common approaches
are (i) to average over agents and focus on the (approximate) dynamics of the average
probability of contagion or (ii) to average over agents with equal degree and focus on the
(approximate) dynamics of the average probability of contagion for an agent of a given
degree (see Pastor-Satorras et al. (2015) for an extensive review).
The non-linear Equation (3.2) does not have an analytical solution. A common
approach in the literature, used in particular to analyse the outbreak of an epidemic,
is to assume xiptq small enough to discard the factor p1´ xiptqq and thus focus on the
following linear equation
Bxiptq
Bt “ β
Nÿ
j“1
ai,jxjptq . (3.3)
However, this approximation grows exponentially towards `8, whereas it is assumed
to approximate a probability. In a recent contribution, Lee et al. (2019) provide a much
better approximation of the solution of Equation (3.2). More precisely, they define for
all i P N and t P R`, yiptq :“ ´ logp1 ´ xiptqq, and observe that x¯ :“ rx¯1, ..., x¯N sJ
is a solution of the system defined by Equation (3.2) with initial condition x p0q :“
rx1p0q, ..., xN p0qsJ “: x 0, with at least one non-null element to avoid triviality, if and
only if y¯ :“ ry¯1, ..., y¯N sJ is a solution of the system of equations defined for all i P N
by
Byiptq
Bt “ β
ÿ
jPN
ai,jp1´ expp´yjptqqq , (3.4)
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with the corresponding initial condition. They then show that a tight upper bound to
the solution of the system defined by Equation (3.4) when x p0q “ x 0 ă 1 is provided
by
yˇptq :“ ´ lnp1´ x 0q ` rexp pβtAdiagp1´ x 0qq ´ Isdiagp1´ x 0q´1x 0 , (3.5)
and accordingly that xˇ ptq :“ 1´ exp p´yˇptqq is a tight upper bound to the solution x¯
of the system defined by Equation (3.2) with initial condition x p0q “ x 0 in the sense
that one has (see Lee et al. (2019, Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 5.2))
• limtÑ`8 ||xˇ ptq ´ x ptq|| “ 0,
• for any t ě 0, x¯ ptq ĺ xˇ ptq ĺ x˜ ptq where x˜ :“ rx˜1, ..., x˜N sJ is the solution of the
system defined by Equation (3.3) with initial condition x p0q “ x 0.
Hence, xˇ provides an approximation of the probability of contagion that is asymptot-
ically exact and more accurate than the standard linear approximation, even at short
time scale.
3.4 Prophylactic behaviour
From now on, we shall consider that agents base their assessment of the dynamics of
contagion on the approximated contagion probabilities xˇ associated to a given and fixed
initial condition x p0q “ x 0 ă 1, having at least one non-null element. In this sense,
they make decisions on the basis of approximate information. This approach provides a
consistent representation of the decision-making situation of actual agents which ought
to base their decisions on similar approximations.
In this respect, we recall that in our SI setting, all agents eventually become infected.
Thus, agents cannot base their decisions on their asymptotic infection status. Rather,
they shall aim at delaying the growth rate of the epidemic. This is notably the strategy
pursued by most countries during the recent COVID-19 pandemic. More precisely, we
consider that agents consider a target date t¯, which can be interpreted as the planning
horizon or the expected date of availability of a treatment, and aim at minimising the
probability of contagion up to that date. We further assume, for sake of analytical
tractability, that they have a logarithmic utility of the form
uipxˇipt¯qq :“ δi logp1´ xˇipt¯qq, i P N ,
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where xˇipt¯q is the approximate contagion probability given by Equation (3.5) and δi ě 0
is a subjective measure of the value of avoided contagion, or equivalently of the cost of
contagion, for the agent i. One should note that the utility is non-positive and equal to
a benchmark of zero if and only if there is no risk of contagion. In our setting, x 0, β,
and t¯ being fixed, Equation (3.5) implies that the contagion probability is completely
determined by the adjacency matrix A. The utility of agent i P N can thus be expressed
directly as
vipAq :“ ´δi ă ei, exp pβt¯Adiagp1´ x 0qqdiagp1´ x 0q´1x 0 ą , (3.6)
where the constant term lnp1´ x 0q ` diagp1´ x 0q´1x 0 has been discarded to simplify
the notations.
Equation (3.6) highlights that, for a given admissible initial probability of conta-
gion x 0, the only lever that agents can use to reduce their contagion probability is the
decrease of the contagiousness of the network, i.e. the decrease of the value of the coef-
ficients of the adjacency matrix A. This is exactly the strategy put in place during the
COVID-19 pandemic, at the local scale through social distancing measures, and at the
global scale through travel restrictions and border shutdowns (see Colizza et al. (2006)
for an analysis of the role of the global transport network in epidemic propagation).
Formally, we consider a strategic game in which each agent can invest in the reduction
of contagiousness of network links. We distinguish two alternative settings to account
for potential constraints on agents’ actions:
• In the global game, we assume that each agent can invest in the reduction of
contagiousness of every network link. Therefore, the set of admissible strategy
profiles is given by SpAq :“ tpDiqiPN P pSN pR`qqN : A´řiPN Di ě 0u.
• In the local game, we assume that each agent can only invest in the links through
which it is connected. Therefore, the set of admissible strategy profiles is given
by KpAq :“ tpDiqiPN P SpAq : @ i P N , @ k, j P N , k, j ‰ iñ dik,j “ 0u.
Local games correspond to a setting where agents are individuals that limit their social
interactions through individual and costly measures. On the other hand, global games
apply to a more involved setting where agents are organisations (regions, countries)
that have the ability to subsidise the investment of other agents in the reduction of
contagiousness, either directly or indirectly.
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Remark 3.2. Both SpAq and KpAq are non-empty, convex and compact sets.
The payoff function is defined in a similar fashion in both settings:
• First, a strategy profile pDiqiPN turns the adjacency matrix into A´řiPN Di and
thus yields to agent i P N a utility
UipDi, D´iq :“ vipA´
ÿ
iPN
Diq “ ´δi ă ei, exp
˜
βt¯pA´
ÿ
iPN
Diqdiagp1´ x 0q
¸
diagp1´ x 0q´1x 0 ą ,
where D´i :“ pDjqjPN , j‰i is the strategy profile of all agents but i.
• Second, we consider that agents face a linear cost for their investment in the
reduction of contagion. More precisely, one has for all i P N ,
CipDiq :“ ρ1JDi1 “ ρ
ÿ
j,kPN
dij,k ,
where ρ ą 0 is the cost parameter.
• Overall, the payoff of agent i P N given a strategy profile pDiqiPN is given by
ΠipDi, D´iq :“ UipDi, D´iq ´ CipDiq
“ ´δi ă ei, exp
˜
βt¯pA´
ÿ
iPN
Diqdiagp1´ x 0q
¸
diagp1´ x 0q´1x 0 ą ´ρ1JDi1 .
A few remarks are in order about the characteristics of the game. First, agents’ strategy
sets are constrained by the choices of other players. Namely, given a strategy profile
for the other players D´i P pSN pR`qqN´1, the set of admissible strategies for player i is
SipA,D´iq :“ tDi P SN pR`q | pDi, D´iq P SpAqu (resp. KipA,D´iq :“ tDi P SN pR`q |
pDi, D´iq P KpAqu) in the global (resp. local) game. Although, it is not the most
standard, this setting is comprehensively analysed in the literature (see, e.g., Rosen
(1965)). Second, linear cost is a natural assumption in our framework. Indeed, the
marginal cost paid to decrease the contagiousness of a link should not depend on the
identity of the player investing. Third, the payoff function is always non-positive as it
is the combination of both a utility and a cost that are always non-positive. Finally, for
large t¯ and homogeneous initial contagion probabilities, the utility can be approximated
through the eigenvector centrality of the contagion network, as detailed in the following
lemma.
Definition 3.1 (pαq-Homogeneous Game). A game is pαq-homogeneous if it involves
an homogeneous initial probability of contagion, i.e. such that for all i P N , x0i “ α
for some α P p0, 1q.
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Lemma 3.1. Consider an pαq-Homogeneous Game, and let D P SpAq be such that
A ´ řiPN Di is irreducible and aperiodic. Let then µ1 denote the Perron-Frobenius
eigenvalue of pA´řiPN Diq, |µ1´µ2| the spectral gap and v the normalised eigenvector
associated to µ1, corresponding to the eigenvector centrality of the network. One has
exp
˜
βt¯p1´ αqpA´
ÿ
iPN
Diq
¸
“ p1`Opexpp´βt¯p1´ αq|µ1 ´ µ2|qqq exppβt¯p1´ αqµ1qvvJ .
Remark 3.3. As A is irreducible and aperiodic, the condition
ř
iPN dij,k ă aj,k for all
j, k P N such that aj,k ą 0, is sufficient for getting the irreducibility and aperiodicity of
A´řiPN Di .
We now state some properties on the marginal utility and the payoff function (recall
the notations for the partial derivatives of a symmetric matrix in Section 3.1).
Lemma 3.2. For every i P N , for any strategy profile pDi, D´iq P SpAq, and for all
k, ` P N ,
BUip¨, D´iq
Bditk,`u
pDiq “ BUip¨, D
´iq
Bdik,`
pDiq ` BUip¨, D
´iq
Bdi`,k
pDiq
“ δiβt¯
˜
exppβt¯pA´
ÿ
jPN , j ­“i
Dj ´Diqdiagp1´ x0qq
¸
i,k
x0`
` δiβt¯
˜
exppβt¯pA´
ÿ
jPN , j ­“i
Dj ´Diq diagp1´ x0qq
¸
i,`
x0k , (3.7)
and the marginal utility is non-negative. Moreover, the map Πip¨, D´iq is concave on
SipA,D´iq.
From the previous lemma derives the following result relating the marginal utility
of every agent to the utility itself, when the initial probability of infection is constant
among agents.
Lemma 3.3. Consider an pαq-Homogeneous Game, and let M Ď N . For every i P N ,
and for any strategy profile pDi, D´iq P SpAq,ÿ
k,`PN
k or `PM
BUip¨, D´iq
Bditk,`u
pDiq “ ´2CardpMqδiβt¯α
ÿ
kPN
˜
exppβt¯p1´ αqpA´
ÿ
iPN
Diqq
¸
i,k
“ ´2CardpMqβt¯p1´ αqUip¨, D´iqpDiq . (3.8)
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3.5 Nash Equilibrium and Social Optimum
In the following, unless otherwise specified, we consider as implicitly given the utility
weights δ :“ rδ1, ..., δN sJ, the time-horizon t¯, the unit contagion rate β, the initial
contagion matrix A, the initial contagion probabilities x 0, and the investment cost ρ.
We then define the “local game” Lpδ, A, β, t¯,x 0, ρq as the game with strategy profiles
in KpAq and payoff function Π and the “global game” Gpδ, A, β, t¯,x 0, ρq as the one with
strategy profiles in SpAq and payoff function Π. In this setting, a Nash Equilibrium is
defined as follows.
Definition 3.2 (Nash Equilibrium).
• An admissible set of strategies Dˇ :“ pDˇiqiPN P SpAq is a Nash Equilibrium for
the global game if
@i P N , @Di P SipA, Dˇ´iq, ΠipDˇi, Dˇ´iq ě ΠipDi, Dˇ´iq .
• An admissible set of strategies D¯ :“ pD¯iqiPN P KpAq is a Nash Equilibrium for
the local game if
@i P N , @Di P KipA, D¯´iq, ΠipD¯i, D¯´iq ě ΠipDi, D¯´iq .
The existence of a Nash Equilibrium follows from standard arguments.
Theorem 3.1. There exists a Nash Equilibrium in both the local and global games.
Remark 3.4. In our setting, equilibrium is in general not unique as there might be in-
determinacy on the identity of the players/neighbours which ought to invest in reducing
the contagion of a link (see the discussions in Section 4.1 below).
The key concern, in the remaining of this paper, is the study of the efficiency of
Nash Equilibrium. As commonly done in N -agent games, and in particular in network
games, we define as Social Optimum, the outcome that maximises the equally-weighted
sum of individual utilities.
Definition 3.3 (Social Optimum). An admissible set of strategies Dˆ :“ pDˆiqiPN P SpAq
is a Social Optimum if
Dˆ “ argmaxpDiqiPN PSpAq
ÿ
iPN
Πi
`
D´i, Di
˘
.
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Note that
ř
iPN ΠipDi, D´iq only depends on the value of
ř
iPN Di. First, this im-
plies that the notion of Social Optimum is the same in the local and global game. Indeed,
it is straightforward to check that for every pDiqiPN P SpAq, there exists pD˜iqiPN P KpAq
such that
ř
iPN D˜i “
ř
iPN Di. Second, given a matrix D P SN pR`q such that D ď A,
we shall let
ΠˆpDq :“
ÿ
iPN
vˆipDq ´ ρ
ÿ
j,kPN
dj,k ,
where vˆi : D ÞÑ vipA´Dq, and, with a slight abuse of notation, state that Dˆ is a Social
Optimum if it is such that ΠˆpDq is maximal over DpAq :“ tD P SN pR`q : D ď Au.
The existence of a Social Optimum directly follows from the continuity of Πˆ and the
compactness of DpAq .
Theorem 3.2. There exists a Social Optimum in both the local and global games.
We end this section with two lemmas that are the counterparts of Lemma 3.2-
3.3 above for the Social Optimum D P DpAq and whose proofs are a straightforward
adaptation of the proofs of the latter lemmas.
Lemma 3.4. For every i P N , for any Social Optimum D P DpAq, and for all k, ` P N ,
BvˆipDq
Bdtk,`u “ δiβt¯ pexppβt¯pA´Dqdiagp1´ x0qqqi,k x0`
` δiβt¯ pexppβt¯pA´Dqdiagp1´ x0qqqi,` x0k ě 0 .
Moreover, the map vˆip¨q is concave on DpAq.
Lemma 3.5. Consider an pαq-Homogeneous Game, and let M Ď N . For every i P N ,
and for any Social Optimum D P DpAq,ÿ
k,`PN
k or `PM
BvˆipDq
Bdtk,`u “ ´2CardpMqβt¯p1´ αqvˆipDq . (3.9)
4 Individual behaviour and policy response
In this section, we provide a characterisation of equilibrium behaviours as a function
of the network structure. We then measure, through the PoA, potential inefficiencies
induced by individual behaviours, giving insight on how to restore optimality in the
local game.
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4.1 Characterisation of equilibrium behaviours
Let i P N . Individual prophylactic efforts are characterised by the investment in con-
tagion reduction Di P SN pR`q that the individual performs in the links it has access to
(SpAq or KpAq). As emphasised above, the network of contagion is assumed undirected
and thus investments in the link tk, `u P E induce an equal reduction of the contagion
weights ak,` and a`,k. More precisely, the marginal impact of the investment made by
player i is characterised by Equation (3.7) above. This equation highlights the bilateral
impact of agents’ investments on contagion from ` to k on the one hand and from k
to ` on the other hand. The impact on agent i of reduced contagiousness through dik,`
(from ` to k) depends on (i) the utility weight δi, (ii) the initial contagiousness of node
`, x0` , and (iii) the connectivity between k and i measured, for D :“ pDiqiPN , through
Ci,kpA,D, β, t¯,x 0q :“ βt¯
´
exppβt¯pA´řjPN Djq diagp1´ x 0qq¯
i,k
, or alternatively
Ci,kpA,D, β, t¯,x 0q “ 1
n !
8ÿ
n“0
pβt¯qn`1
˜
pA´
ÿ
jPN
Djqdiagp1´ x 0q
¸n
i,k
.
Hence, the connectivity from k to i, Ci,kpA,D, β, t¯,x 0q, depends on the initial structure
of the contagion network A, the strategic investments in the reduction of contagiousness
D, the unit contagion rate β, the time-horizon t¯, and the initial contagion probabilities
x 0. It corresponds to the discounted sum of paths from k to i where each path is as-
signed a weight corresponding to the probability that it propagates a genuine contagion
sequence. The weight of each link across the path is thus obtained as the product of
(i) the probability that the link propagates the contagion, which is measured through
the corresponding coefficient pA´řjPN Djq, and (ii) the probability that the end node
is not initially infected, which is measured through the corresponding coefficient of
diagp1´x 0q. Overall, the marginal impact of agents’ actions on contagiousness depends
on the characteristics of the disease, measured through the initial contagion probabil-
ity, and on the structure of the contagion network modified by the agents’ investments.
Equation (3.7) offers a differential characterisation of Nash Equilibria in both the local
and global games, as reported in the following two propositions.
Proposition 4.1. A strategy profile D¯ P KpAq is a Nash Equilibrium of the local game
Lpδ, A, β, t¯,x0, ρq if and only if for all tk, `u P E , the following two conditions hold:
(1) One of the following alternative holds:
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(a) ρ ă maxiPtk,`u δi
`
Ci,kpA, D¯, β, t¯,x0qx0` ` Ci,`pA, D¯, β, t¯,x0qx0k
˘
and d¯ktk,`u` d¯`tk,`u “ atk,`u,
(b) ρ ą maxiPtk,`u δi
`
Ci,kpA, D¯, β, t¯,x0qx0` ` Ci,`pA, D¯, β, t¯,x0qx0k
˘
and d¯ktk,`u “ d¯`tk,`u “ 0,
(c) ρ “ maxiPtk,`u δi
`
Ci,kpA, D¯, β, t¯,x0qx0` ` Ci,`pA, D¯, β, t¯,x0qx0k
˘
and d¯ktk,`u`d¯`tk,`u P r0, atk,`us.
(2) For any i P N , one has d¯itk,`u ą 0 only if
δi
`
Ci,kpA, D¯, β, t¯,x0qx0` ` Ci,`pA, D¯, β, t¯,x0qx0k
˘ ě ρ .
Proposition 4.2. A strategy profile Dˇ P SpAq is a Nash Equilibrium of the global game
Gpδ, A, β, t¯,x0, ρq if and only if for all tk, `u P E , the following two conditions hold:
(1) One of the following alternative holds:
(a) ρ ă maxiPN δi
`
Ci,kpA, Dˇ, β, t¯,x0qx0` ` Ci,`pA, Dˇ, β, t¯,x0qx0k
˘
and
ř
iPN dˇitk,`u “ atk,`u,
(b) ρ ą maxiPN δi
`
Ci,kpA, Dˇ, β, t¯,x0qx0` ` Ci,`pA, Dˇ, β, t¯,x0qx0k
˘
and
ř
iPN dˇitk,`u “ 0,
(c) ρ “ maxiPN δi
`
Ci,kpA, Dˇ, β, t¯,x0qx0` ` Ci,`pA, Dˇ, β, t¯,x0qx0k
˘
and
ř
iPN dˇitk,`u P r0, atk,`us.
(2) For any i P N , one has dˇitk,`u ą 0 only if
δi
`
Ci,kpA, Dˇ, β, t¯,x0qx0` ` Ci,`pA,D, β, t¯,x0qx0k
˘ ě ρ .
The difference between Proposition 4.1 and 4.2 stems from the fact that different
sets of agents can invest in a given link: the agents at the nodes corresponding to that
link in the local case and all agents in the global case. Otherwise, their interpretation
is similar. If the investment cost is large with respect to the marginal utility of players
at equilibrium, there is no investment in the link. If the investment cost is smaller than
the marginal utility of at least one player at equilibrium, there is full investment in the
link, i.e. it is completely suppressed. Finally, there is the “interior” case in which only
the agents with the largest marginal utility invest in the link. They do so up to the
point where their individual marginal utility equals the investment cost. The following
definition summarises the different characterisations of equilibria.
Definition 4.1 (Equilibrium characterisation).
• A local (resp. global) Full Investment Equilibrium is an equilibrium that satisfies,
for all tk, `u P E , case (a) of Proposition 4.1 (resp. 4.2).
• A local (resp. global) No Investment Equilibrium is an equilibrium that satisfies,
for all tk, `u P E , case (b) of Proposition 4.1 (resp. 4.2).
• A local (resp. global) Interior Equilibrium is an equilibrium that satisfies, for all
tk, `u P E , case (c) of Proposition 4.1 (resp. 4.2).
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• A local (resp. global) Homogeneous Interior Equilibrium is a special case of local
(resp. global) Interior Equilibrium where, for each tk, `u P E, the marginal utilities
of agents k, ` (resp. all agents) are equal.
We observe that in the case of a Full Investment Equilibrium or an Interior Equilib-
rium, there can be an indeterminacy on the identities of the agents that invest. Namely,
let EGtk,`upDq :“ ti P N | δi pCi,kpA,D, β, t¯,x 0qx0` ` Ci,`pA,D, β, t¯,x 0qx0kq ě ρu, be the
set of players susceptible to invest in the link tk, `u P E at an equilibrium D of the global
game and ELtk,`upDq :“ ti P tk, `u | δi pCi,kpA,D, β, t¯,x 0qx0` ` Ci,`pA,D, β, t¯,x 0qx0kq ě
ρu, be the set of players susceptible to invest in the link tk, `u P E at an equilibrium D
of the local game. Proposition 4.3 below, resulting from Proposition 4.1-4.2, highlights
a form of substitutability of investments that arises at equilibrium.
Proposition 4.3. Let D be an equilibrium of the global game Gpδ, A, β, t¯,x0, ρq (resp.
local game Lpδ, A, β, t¯,x0, ρq). Assume that D˜ P SpAq (resp. D˜ P KpAq) is such that
for all tk, `u P E , one has:
(1)
ř
iPN d˜itk,`u “
ř
iPN ditk,`u,
(2) For any i P N , d˜itk,`u ą 0 only if i P EGtk,`u (resp. i P ELtk,`u).
Then D˜ is an equilibrium of the global (resp. local) game.
Hence, each player that has a large enough marginal utility is willing to invest in
a link up to the equilibrium level independently of the actions of other players. This
leads to indeterminacy on the allocation of investments (and thus of the related costs)
among players that have a large enough marginal utility.
Remark 4.1. Consider the game Gpδ, A, β, t¯,x0, ρq (resp. Lpδ, A, β, t¯,x0, ρqq and its
equilibrium D. We observe that, whenever for some i, j, k, ` P N , δipCi,kp¨qx0` `
Ci,`p¨qx0kqpA,D, β, t¯,x0q ě δjpCj,kp¨qx0` ` Cj,`p¨qx0kqpA,D, β, t¯,x0q, then j P EGtk,`u
(resp. j P ELtk,`u) implies i P EGtk,`u (resp. i P ELtk,`u provided that i “ k or `).
Moreover, Proposition 4.1-4.3 imply that Full Investment Equilibria and Interior
Equilibria have a notable property: they induce equilibria in each network that is more
strongly connected than the equilibrium network (i.e. with a weight on each link higher
than the one of the corresponding link in the equilibrium network). This property is
formally stated in the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.4. Let D be a Full Investment Equilibrium or an Interior Equilibrium
of the global game Gpδ, A, β, t¯,x0, ρq (resp. local game Lpδ, A, β, t¯,x0, ρq). Then for
all A˜ ě A ´ řiPN Di, any strategy profile D˜ P SpA˜q (resp. D˜ P KpA˜q) such thatř
iPN D˜i :“
ř
iPN Di`A˜´A is a Full Investment Equilibrium or an Interior Equilibrium
of Gpδ, A˜, β, t¯,x0, ρq (resp. Lpδ, A˜, β, t¯,x0, ρq). Finally, both equilibria induce the same
equilibrium network.
We end this section discussing a salient example of existence of global equilibria in
local strategies, that of a symmetric game and an almost fully-connected network.
Definition 4.2 (pα, δq-Symmetric Game & Complete/paq-Complete Network).
• A game is pα, δq-symmetric if for all i P N , δi “ δ for some δ ą 0 and x0i “ α
for some α P p0, 1q.
• A network is complete if for all k, ` P N , k ‰ `, ak,` ą 0. In particular, the
network is paq-complete if for all k, ` P N , k ‰ `, ak,` “ a for some a ą 0.
Example 4.1. Consider an pα, δq-Symmetric Game and an paq-Complete Network.
The game is then symmetric and, using the non-emptiness, convexity and compactness
properties of the strategy space as well as the continuity and concavity properties of
the payoff, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in both the local and global games (see
Cheng et al. (2004, Theorem 3)). We shall show that both equilibria coincide and that,
for ρ in an appropriate range, they are interior. Indeed, let Dˇ P SpAq, be a symmetric
equilibrium of the global game. According to Equation (3.7), one has for all i, k, ` P N ,
BUip¨, Dˇ´iq
Bditk,`u
pDˇiq “ δβt¯α pexppHqi,k ` exppHqi,`q , (4.1)
where H is of the form
H :“
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˝
0 h . . . h
h
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . h
h . . . h 0
‹˛‹‹‹‹‚ with h :“ βt¯p1´ αqpa´
ÿ
iPN
dˇik,`q, k, ` P N , k ‰ ` . (4.2)
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Using a Taylor expansion, one can prove that exppHq is of the form
exppHq :“
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˝
χphq χphq ´ expp´hq . . . χphq ´ expp´hq
χphq ´ expp´hq . . . . . . ...
...
. . .
. . . χphq ´ expp´hq
χphq ´ expp´hq . . . χphq ´ expp´hq χphq
‹˛‹‹‹‹‚ ,
where χphq :“ 1`řkě1 uk{k!, with pukqkPNzt0u satisfying the following recursive system3$&%u1 “ 0 and v1 “ huk “ hpN ´ 1qvk´1 and vk “ h rpn´ 2qvk´1 ` uk´1s for k ě 2 .
As χphq ą χphq ´ expp´hq, it follows from Equation (4.1) that for all distinct elements
i, k, ` P N , one has
BUip¨, Dˇ´iq
Bditi,`u
pDˇiq ą BUkp¨, Dˇ
´kq
Bdkti,`u
pDˇkq .
Using Proposition 4.2, this yields the following characterisation:
(1) The symmetric equilibrium is such that h “ 0, or equivalently řiPN Dˇi “ A,
leading to χp0q “ 1, if only if ρ ď δβt¯α.
(2) The symmetric equilibrium is such that h “ βt¯p1´αqa, or equivalently řiPN Dˇi “
O if and only if ρ ě δβt¯αχ˜pβt¯p1´ αqaq where χ˜pβt¯p1´ αqaq :“ 2χpβt¯p1´ αqaq ´
expp´βt¯p1´ αqaq.
(3) The symmetric equilibrium is interior if and only if ρ{pδβt¯αq P p1, χ˜pβt¯p1´ αqaqq.
In the third case, the equilibrium is a local Homogeneous Interior Equilibrium, while,
in the first two cases, there exists an equilibrium in local strategies that is equivalent
to Dˇ in the sense of Proposition 4.3.
As stated below, in view of Proposition 4.4, Example 4.1 induces a Full Investment
Equilibrium or an Interior Equilibrium in each network that is sufficiently connected.
Proposition 4.5. Consider an pα, δq-Symmetric Game where there exists ε ą 0 such
that for all k, ` P N , k ‰ `, ak,` ě ε. Then, one has in both the local and global games:
3This system has a closed-form solution that can be determined by elementary methods. However,
its expression is too inconvenient to report it in full length here.
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(1) If ρ{pδβt¯αq ă χ˜pβt¯p1 ´ αqεq, there exists a Full Investment Equilibrium or an
Interior Equilibrium.
(2) If, moreover ρ{pδβt¯αq ą 1, there exists an Interior Equilibrium.
4.2 Social efficiency and the PoA
Using Lemma 3.4, one can provide a differential characterisation of Social Optima, as
reported in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.6. A strategy profile Dˆ P DpAq is a Social Optimum if and only if for
all tk, `u P E , one of the following alternative holds:
(a) ρ ă řiPN δi ´Ci,kpA, Dˆ, β, t¯,x0qx0` ` Ci,`pA, Dˆ, β, t¯,x0qx0k¯ and dˆtk,`u “ atk,lu,
(b) ρ ą řiPN δi ´Ci,kpA, Dˆ, β, t¯,x0qx0` ` Ci,`pA, Dˆ, β, t¯,x0qx0k¯and dˆtk,`u “ 0,
(c) ρ “ řiPN δi ´Ci,kpA, Dˆ, β, t¯,x0qx0` ` Ci,`pA, Dˆ, β, t¯,x0qx0k¯ and dˆtk,`u P r0, atk,lus.
Hence at a Social Optimum, there is investment in a link only if the sum of marginal
utilities induced by the investment is larger than or equal to the investment cost. If the
cost is smaller than the sum of marginal utilities, then the link is completely suppressed
(case (a)). On the other hand, if the solution is interior, then the level of investment is
such that the sum of marginal utilities is exactly equal to the investment cost (case (c)).
By analogy with the case of Nash Equilibria, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 4.3 (Social Optimum characterisation).
• A Full Investment Optimum is an optimum that satisfies, for all tk, `u P E , case
(a) of Proposition 4.6.
• A No Investment Optimum is an optimum that satisfies, for all tk, `u P E , case
(b) of Proposition 4.6.
• An Interior Optimum is an optimum that satisfies, for all tk, `u P E , case (c) of
Proposition 4.6.
The comparison between Proposition 4.6 and Proposition 4.1 and 4.2 underlines
the fact that investment in contagion reduction has all the features of a public good
problem. At equilibrium, the investment level is determined by the marginal utility of a
single agent (the one with the largest willingness to pay) while social efficiency requires
the investment level to be determined by the sum of all marginal utilities. To quantify
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more precisely this inefficiency and its dependence on the network structure, we shall
use as a metric the PoA (see, e.g., Papadimitriou (2001); Nisan et al. (2007); Omic et al.
(2009); Hayel et al. (2014)). In our setting, where social welfare is always negative, the
PoA is defined as the ratio between the social welfare at a Nash Equilibrium and the
welfare at a Social Optimum. Accordingly, the PoA in the local and global games are
respectively defined as follows
PoALoc :“ |Worst social welfare at a local Nash Equilibrium||Social welfare at a Social Optimum| , (4.3)
PoAGlo :“ |Worst social welfare at a global Nash Equilibrium||Social welfare at a Social Optimum| . (4.4)
By construction, the PoA is greater or equal to 1 and equal to 1 only when all Nash
Equilibria of the game are socially optimal. An increasing PoA corresponds to an
increasing social inefficiency of individual behaviours at a Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem 4.1 and 4.2 below provide a partial characterisation of the PoA in the case
of an pαq-Homogeneous Game and Complete Network.
Theorem 4.1. Consider an pαq-Homogeneous Game and a Complete Network. Assume
that the global game Gpδ, A, β, t¯,x0, ρq is such that: the worst Nash Equilibrium Dˇ is
not a Full Investment Equilibrium and one of the corresponding Social Optima Dˆ is not
a Null Investment Optimum. Then
PoAGlo ď
N2
2βt¯p1´αq ` 1J
ř
iPN Dˇi1
N
2βt¯p1´αq ` 1JDˆ1
ď N ` 2βt¯p1´ αq
N
1
JA1 .
The upper bound for PoALoc has a stronger dependence on the structure of the
network.
Theorem 4.2. Consider an pαq-Homogeneous Game and a Complete Network with
N ě 3. Assume that the local game Lpδ, A, β, t¯,x0, ρq is such that: the worst Nash
Equilibrium D¯ is not a Full Investment Equilibrium and one of the corresponding Social
Optima Dˆ is not a Null Investment Optimum. Then
PoALoc ď
1
2βt¯p1´αq
”
N2ρ` pN´2qαpN´1q
ř
iPN Kipδi, A, D¯, D¯, β, t¯,x0q
ı
` ρ1JřiPN D¯i1
ρ
”
N
2βt¯p1´αq ` 1JDˆ1
ı
ď N ` pN ´ 2qα
NpN ´ 1qρ
ÿ
iPN
Kipδi, A,O,A, β, t¯,x0q ` 2βt¯p1´ αq
N
1
JA1 ,
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where for any adjacency matrix B and strategy profiles D,D1, Kipδi, B,D,D1, β, t¯,x0q :“ř
kPN
k‰i
δipCi,kpB,D, β, t¯,x0q ´ Ci,ipB,D1, β, t¯,x0qq.
In particular, for all i, k P N , k ‰ i,
0 ď ρ` αδirCi,kpA, D¯, β, t¯,x0q ´ Ci,ipA, D¯, β, t¯,x0qs ď 2rρ´ αδiCi,ipA, D¯, β, t¯,x0qs .
Theorem 4.1 and 4.2 imply that the PoA grows at most linearly with the number of
agents. As highlighted in the proposition below (that recalls the notations of Example
4.1), the case of a Symmetric Game shows that one cannot improve this linear bound.
Proposition 4.7. Consider an pα, δq-Symmetric Game and an paq-Complete Network
with N ě 3. Assume that ρ{pδβt¯αq P p2, χ˜pβt¯p1´ αqaqq , and let Dˇ (resp. Dˆ) be the
worst Nash Equilibrium (resp. one of the corresponding Social Optima). Then
PoAGlo “ PoALoc “
N2ρ
2βt¯p1´αq ´ NpN´2qδα expp´hq2p1´αq ` ρ1J
ř
iPN Dˇi1
Nρ
2βt¯p1´αq ` ρ1JDˆ1
ď N ´ pN ´ 2qδβt¯α expp´hq
ρ
` 2βt¯p1´ αq
N
1
JA1 ,
where h :“ βt¯p1 ´ αqpa ´ řiPN dˇik,`q ą 0, for any k, ` P N , k ‰ `. In particular,
ρ´ δβt¯α expp´hq ě 0.
Our previous results highlight the fact that individual strategic behaviours can lead
to major inefficiencies in the containment of epidemic spreading. In particular, there
can be complete free-riding of other players on the investment of the agent that is the
most affected by the epidemic (Proposition 4.1 and 4.2) and the inefficiency can scale
up to linearly with the number of agents (Theorem 4.1 and 4.2 and Proposition 4.7).
In other words, individual strategic behaviours can be highly inefficient in terms of
social welfare as soon as there is a large number of agents involved. This is the case in
real-world applications whether one considers epidemic spreading between individuals
at the domestic scale or between countries at the global scale.
Against this backdrop, it is natural to search for a public policy response for the
prevention of epidemic spreading. During the recent COVID-19 outbreak, a widespread
policy response has been the implementation of social distancing measures that have
reduced, in a uniform way, the scale of social interactions. Formally, we can de-
fine the social distancing policy at level κ P R` as restricting social interactions to
24
CpA, κq :“ pci,jqi,jPN such that for all i, j P N , ci,j :“ κai,j{řkPN ai,k (or equiva-
lently ci,j :“ κai,j{řkPN ak,i as A is symmetric). The level κ P R` must be such that
A´CpA, κq ě O. Hence, the social distancing policy amounts to bounding the level of
social interactions of each agent to a fixed level. In practice, this has been implemented
by massive restrictions on socio-economic activities such as interdiction of public gath-
erings, closing of schools and businesses, and travel restrictions. A formal analysis of
this policy in our framework shows it can be socially efficient, at least if the initial con-
tagion probability and the disutility are assumed to be uniform. Namely, it is optimal
in the following sense.
Proposition 4.8. Consider a pα, δq-Symmetric Game and assume that řkPN ai,k ą 0
for all i P N .
1. If 2δβt¯α ě ρ, then κ “ 0 is optimal and the optimal social distancing measure
involves the suppression of every link.
2. If 2δβt¯α ă ρ, then for every ε ą 0, there exists T¯ ą 0 such that for t¯ ě T¯ , one
can find 2δβt¯α ă ρ ď 2δβt¯α exppβt¯p1 ´ αq ˆ miniPN řkPN ai,kq for which there
exists an admissible κ ą 0 satisfying
ΠˆpA´ CpA, κqq ě max
DPDpAq
ΠˆpDq ´ ε .
In this case, for every ε ą 0 and for t¯ large enough, there is an ε´optimal social
distancing measure which does not involve any suppression of link.
Hence, uniform reduction of social interactions appears as being an extremely ef-
ficient policy in our framework. This appears as a natural counterpart to existing
results in the literature that emphasise the role of highly connected nodes, e.g.,“super
spreaders”, in epidemic propagation (see, e.g., Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani (2001);
Pastor-Satorras et al. (2015)). Our result would benefit from further research on the
extent to which one could relax the assumption that the “implicit” costs of connectiv-
ity reduction are homogeneous. This assumption indeed neglects the fact that certain
actors might value more social interactions because of their economic, psychological,
or social characteristics. Moreover, results on the determination of the optimal level
of social distancing would also be welcome. In practice, the level of social distanc-
ing has been determined according to policy decisions about the socially/economically
acceptable rate of contagion, rather than inferred from individual preferences.
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5 The PoK
Social distancing measures can be implemented at the domestic scale in order to re-
duce the propagation of epidemics between individuals. However, at the international
scale, there is no authority entitled to implement such coercive measures. Furthermore,
individual countries can take measures to reduce their interactions with other coun-
tries, e.g., border closures, but cannot directly reduce interactions between two other
countries. They are thus, by default, in the framework of a local game. One could
nevertheless consider schemes in which countries with a higher disutility from infection
subsidise investments in other parts of the network to reduce global contagiousness.
This would turn the problem into a global game. In order to compare outcomes in
these two situations, we introduce the notion of PoK, which corresponds to the ratio
between the social welfare at the worst equilibrium of the local game and at the best
equilibrium of the global game.
PoK :“ |Worst social welfare at a Nash Equilibrium of the local game||Best social welfare at a Nash Equilibrium of the global game| .
In particular, if PoK ą 1, then global equilibria are better than local ones. On the
contrary if global and local equilibria coincide (as in Example 4.1), PoK “ 1. The
latter implies in particular that an increase in the set of admissible strategies does not
necessarily induce an increase in individual welfare. Sometimes it could even lead to
more free riding. In general, the value of the PoK is determined by the network structure
and the individual disutilities associated to contagion, measured by the coefficients
δi, i P N . In particular, following the lines of the proofs of Theorem 4.1-4.2, one can
provide an explicit lower bound on the PoK, as detailed in the theorem below.
Theorem 5.1. Consider an pαq-Homogeneous Game and a Complete Network with
N ě 3. Assume that the local game Lpδ, A, β, t¯,x0, ρq and global game Gpδ, A, β, t¯,x0, ρq
are such that: the worst local Nash Equilibrium D¯ is an Homogeneous Interior Equi-
librium and the best global Nash Equilibrium Dˇ is not a Full Investment Equilibrium.
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Then
PoK ě
1
βt¯p1´αq
“
NpN ´ 1qρ´ pN ´ 2qαřiPN δiCi,ipA, D¯, β, t¯,x0q‰` ρ1JřiPN D¯i1
ρ
”
N2
2βt¯p1´αq ` 1J
ř
iPN Dˇi1
ı
(5.1)
ě
N
βt¯p1´αq
N2
2βt¯p1´αq ` 1JA1
.
In particular, for all i, k P N , k ‰ i,
0 ď ρ` αδirCi,kpA, D¯, β, t¯,x0q ´ Ci,ipA, D¯, β, t¯,x0qs “ 2rρ´ αδiCi,ipA, D¯, β, t¯,x0qs .
(5.2)
As hinted above, in the case of a Complete Network, under the assumptions of
Proposition 4.7, the conditions of Theorem 5.1 are satisfied and PoK “ 1. Moreover,
Equation (5.1)-(5.2) above highlight the fact that the PoK increases when there exists
agents i P N with a large disutility of contagion δi that are highly connected to other
nodes in the network, as measured by Ci,kp¨q, i, k P N , k ‰ i. A salient example of such
case is that of an paq-Complete Network where one of the agents has a much higher
disutility of contagion than its peers. We thus intend to study this example and more
specifically to consider the limit case where δ “ δe i for some i P N , i.e. where the
disutility of all other agents is negligible with respect to that of agent i. In this setting
there is no indeterminacy on the agent that is playing and we can give a necessary
condition for global strategies to dominate local ones. This is the aim of the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.1. Fix i P N . Consider the local game Lpδei, A, β, t¯,x0, ρq for an pαq-
Homogeneous Game and an paq-Complete Network with N ě 3. If
δiβt¯α ă ρ ă δiβt¯α
ˆ
sinhp?N ´ 1βt¯p1´ αqaq?
N ´ 1 ` coshp
?
N ´ 1βt¯p1´ αqaq
˙
,
then one has:
(1) Any local equilibrium D¯ is an Homogeneous Interior Equilibrium and is such that
D¯j “ O, for all j P N , j ‰ i, and d¯ii,k “ d¯ik,i “ h for all ti, ku P E for some
h P r0, as.
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(2) Global strategies dominate local ones if and only if the parameters β, t¯, α, and a
are such that
sinhp?N ´ 1βt¯p1´ αqpa´ hqq ą ?N ´ 1 coshp?N ´ 1βt¯p1´ αqpa´ hqq .
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the prophylaxis of epidemic spreading from a nor-
mative point of view in a game-theoretic setting. Agents have the common objective to
reduce the speed of propagation of an epidemic of the SI type through investments in
the reduction of the contagiousness of network links. Despite this common objective,
strategic behaviours and free-riding can lead to major inefficiencies. We have shown
that the PoA can scale up to linearly in our setting. This strongly calls for public inter-
vention to reduce the speed of diffusion. In this respect, we have shown that a policy of
uniform reduction of social interactions, akin to the social distancing measures enforced
during the COVID-19 pandemic, can be ε-optimal in a wide range of networks. Such
policies thus have strong normative foundations. Our results however assume that the
cost of reducing interactions is uniform among agents. The validity of this assumption
strongly depends on the scope of the analysis: it is a much more benign approxima-
tion when the focus is on public health than in the case where economic and financial
considerations ought to be taken into account.
We have partly accounted for heterogeneity as far as the benefits of prophylaxis are
concerned. In this setting, we have shown that allowing agents to subsidise investments
in the reduction of contagiousness in distant parts of the network can be Pareto im-
proving. This result calls for further research on the design of mechanisms to improve
the efficiency of cooperation against epidemic spreading.
Appendix
Proof. [of Lemma 3.1] The proof follows from the spectral decomposition of A ´ř
iPN Di and a direct application of the Perron-Frobenius theorem. See Lee et al. (2019,
Appendix C) for details.
Proof. [of Lemma 3.2] Let i P N and pDi, D´iq be a strategy profile in SpAq. For
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k, ` P N , one has
BUip¨, D´iq
Bditk,`u
pDiq “ δi ă ei, βt¯ exp pβt¯pA´
ÿ
jPN , j ­“i
Dj ´Diq diagp1´ x 0qqpIˆk,` ` Iˆ`,kqx 0 ą ,
where for any k, j P N , Iˆk,j is the N´ dimensional square matrix with null entries
except on the kth´row and jth´column for which the entry is equal to one. This leads
to Equation (3.7). Moreover, for all k, `, p, q P N , we compute
BUip¨, D´iq
Bdik,`Bdip,q
pDiq
“ ´ ă ei, pβt¯q2 exp pβt¯pA´
ÿ
jPN , j ­“i
Dj ´Diqdiagp1´ x 0qqIˆp,qdiagp1´ x 0qIˆk,`x 0 ą
“
$&%´pβt¯q
2
´
exp pβt¯pA´řjPN , j ­“iDj ´Diqdiagp1´ x 0qq¯
i,p
p1´ x0qqx0` if k “ q
0 otherwise
.
Therefore the Hessian matrix of Uip¨, D´iq on SipA,D´iq is the matrix of a quadratic
form that is negative semi-definite. The concavity property thus follows.
Proof. [of Theorem 3.1] We know from Remark 3.2 that the sets SpAq and KpAq
of admissible strategies are compact and convex, and from Lemma 3.2 that the ob-
jective function Π is concave on SipA,D´iq and KipA,D´iq with i P N and D´i P
pSN pR`qqN´1. Moreover, since Π is continuous in its arguments, we therefore conclude
from Rosen (1965, Theorem 1) that a Nash Equilibrium exists.
Proof. [of proposition 4.1] For 1 ď i ď N , the optimisation programme for charac-
terising the Nash Equilibria writes
max
DiPMN
ΠipDi, D¯´iq
subject to:
dik,` “ di`,k, @ k, ` P N , ` ă k , (A-1)
dik,` “ 0, @ k, ` P N , ` ą k, k and ` ‰ i ,
dik,` ě 0, @ k, ` P N , ` ą k, k or ` “ i ,
pA´ D¯´i ´Diqk,` ě 0, @ k, ` P N , ` ě k . (A-2)
Applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we obtain that D¯i P KipA, D¯´iq is a
solution if and only if, for any tk, `u P E , one of the following cases holds, assuming
without loss of generality that BUkp¨, D¯´kq{Bdktk,`upD¯kq ď BU`p¨, D¯´`q{Bd`tk,`upD¯`q:
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(a) (i) ρ ă BUkp¨, D¯´kq{Bdktk,`upD¯kq and d¯ktk,`u ` d¯`tk,`u “ atk,`u,
(ii) BUkp¨, D¯´kq{Bdktk,`upD¯kq ă ρ ă BU`p¨, D¯´`q{Bd`tk,`upD¯`q and d¯ktk,`u “ 0, d¯`tk,`u “ atk,`u,
(iii) BUkp¨, D¯´kq{Bdktk,`upD¯kq “ ρ ă BU`p¨, D¯´`q{Bd`tk,`upD¯`q and d¯ktk,`u P r0, atk,`us, d¯`tk,`u “
atk,`u ´ d¯ktk,`u,
(b) ρ ą BU`p¨, D¯´`q{Bd`tk,`upD¯`q and d¯ktk,`u “ d¯`tk,`u “ 0,
(c) (i) BUkp¨, D¯´kq{Bdktk,`upD¯kq ă ρ “ BU`p¨, D¯´`q{Bd`tk,`upD¯`q and d¯ktk,`u “ 0, d¯`tk,`u P r0, atk,`us,
(ii) BUkp¨, D¯´kq{Bdktk,`upD¯kq “ ρ “ BU`p¨, D¯´`q{Bd`tk,`upD¯`q and 0 ď d¯ktk,`u ` d¯`tk,`u ď atk,`u.
Proof. [of Proposition 4.2] For 1 ď i ď N , the optimisation programme for charac-
terising the Nash Equilibria writes
max
DiPMN
ΠipDi, Dˇ´iq
subject to:
Condition (A-1)-(A-2) ,
dik,` ě 0, @ k, ` P N , ` ą k .
Applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we obtain that Dˇi P SipA, Dˇ´iq is a
solution if and only if, for any tk, `u P E , one of the following cases holds:
(a) (i) ρ ă miniPN
´
BUip¨, Dˇ´iq{Bditk,`upDˇiq
¯
and
ř
qPN dˇ
q
tk,`u “ atk,`u,
(ii) there exists i, j P N , such that BUip¨, Dˇ´iq{Bditk,`upDˇiq ă ρ ă BUjp¨, Dˇ´jq{Bdjtk,`upDˇjq and
dˇqtk,`u “ 0 for all q P AipDˇq,
ř
qPA¯jpDˇq dˇ
q
tk,`u “ atk,`u, where for a given h ě 1,
AhpDˇq :“
#
1 ď r ď N : BUrp¨, Dˇ
´rq
Bdrtk,`u
pDˇrq ď BUhp¨, Dˇ
´hq
Bdhtk,`u
pDˇhq
+
,
and
A¯hpDˇq :“
#
1 ď r ď N : BUrp¨, Dˇ
´rq
Bdrtk,`u
pDˇrq ě BUhp¨, Dˇ
´hq
Bdhtk,`u
pDˇhq
+
,
(iii) there exists i, j P N , such that BUip¨, Dˇ´iq{Bditk,`upDˇiq “ ρ ă BUjp¨, Dˇ´jq{Bdjtk,`upDˇjq
and 0 ď řqPAˆipDˇq dˇqtk,`u ď atk,`u, dˇqtk,`u “ 0 for all q P `A¯ipDˇq˘c, řqPA¯jpDˇq dˇqtk,`u “ atk,`u ´ř
qPAˆipDˇq dˇ
q
tk,`u, where for a given h ě 1,
AˆhpDˇq :“
#
1 ď r ď N : BUrp¨, Dˇ
´rq
Bdrtk,`u
pDˇrq “ BUhp¨, Dˇ
´hq
Bdhtk,`u
pDˇhq
+
,
(b) ρ ą maxiPN
´
BUip¨, Dˇ´iq{Bditk,`upDˇiq
¯
and
ř
qPN dˇ
q
tk,`u “ 0,
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(c) there exists j P N , such that ρ “ BUjp¨, Dˇ´jq{Bdjtk,`upDˇjq and dˇqtk,`u “ 0 for all q P
`A¯jpDˇq˘c,
0 ď řqPAˆjpDˇq dˇqtk,`u ď atk,`u.
Proof. [of Proposition 4.6] For 1 ď i ď N , the optimisation programme for charac-
terising the Social Optima writes
max
DPMN
ΠˆpDq
subject to:
dk,` “ d`,k, @ k, ` P N , ` ă k ,
dk,` ě 0, @ k, ` P N , ` ą k ,
pA´Dqk,` ě 0, @ k, ` P N , ` ě k .
The proof is then a straightforward adaptation of the proof of Proposition 4.1 and 4.2.
Proof. [of Theorem 4.1] It follows from the assumption on Dˇ that for all i P N ,
ÿ
k,`PN
k‰`
BUip¨, Dˇ´iq
Bditk,`u
pDˇiq ď NpN ´ 1qρ . (A-3)
Therefore appealing to Equation (3.8) and Equation (A-3), we obtainÿ
iPN
ΠipDˇi, Dˇ´iq “
ÿ
iPN
UipDˇi, Dˇ´iq ´ ρ1J
ÿ
iPN
Dˇi1
“ ´ 1
2pN ´ 1qβt¯p1´ αq
ÿ
iPN
ÿ
k,`PN
k‰`
BUip¨, Dˇ´iq
Bditk,`u
pDˇiq ´ ρ1J
ÿ
iPN
Dˇi1
ě ´ρ
«
N2
2βt¯p1´ αq ` 1
J ÿ
iPN
Dˇi1
ff
. (A-4)
Similarly, it follows from the assumption on Dˆ that it is such that for all k, ` P N , k ‰ `,
ÿ
iPN
BvˆipDˆq
Bdtk,`u ě ρ . (A-5)
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We deduce from Equation (3.9) and Equation (A-5),
ΠˆpDˆq “
ÿ
iPN
vˆipDˆq ´ ρ1JDˆ1
“ ´ 1
2pN ´ 1qβt¯p1´ αq
ÿ
iPN
ÿ
k,`PN
k‰`
BvˆipDˆq
Bdtk,`u ´ ρ1
JDˆ1
ď ´ρ
„
N
2βt¯p1´ αq ` 1
JDˆ1

. (A-6)
Combining Equation (A-4) and (A-6) and using Equation (4.4), we obtain the result.
Proof. [of Theorem 4.2] We know from Equation (3.7) that for all i, k, ` P N ,
BUip¨, D¯´iq
Bditk,`u
pD¯iq “ αδirCi,kpA, D¯, β, t¯,x 0q ` Ci,`pA, D¯, β, t¯,x 0qs . (A-7)
Therefore, it follows from the assumption on D¯ that for all i, ` P N , i ‰ `,
BUip¨, D¯´iq
Bditi,`u
pD¯iq “ αδirCi,ipA, D¯, β, t¯,x 0q ` Ci,`pA, D¯, β, t¯,x 0qs ď ρ . (A-8)
Hence Equation (A-7)-(A-8) give that for all distinct i, k, ` P N ,
BUip¨, D¯´iq
Bditk,`u
pD¯iq ď ρ` αδirCi,kpA, D¯, β, t¯,x 0q ´ Ci,ipA, D¯, β, t¯,x 0qs (A-9)
ď 2rρ´ αδiCi,ipA, D¯, β, t¯,x 0qs . (A-10)
We deduce from Equation (A-9)-(A-10) that for all i P N ,ÿ
k,`PN
k‰`
BUip¨, D¯´iq
Bditk,`u
pD¯iq “
ÿ
`PN
`‰i
BUip¨, D¯´iq
Bditi,`u
pD¯iq `
ÿ
kPN
k‰i
BUip¨, D¯´iq
Bditk,iu
pD¯iq `
ÿ
k,`PN
k‰`
k,`‰i
BUip¨, D¯´iq
Bditk,`u
pD¯iq
ď NpN ´ 1qρ` pN ´ 2qαδi
ÿ
kPN , k‰i
pCi,kp¨q ´ Ci,ip¨qqpA, D¯, β, t¯,x 0q
(A-11)
ď 2pN ´ 1qrpN ´ 1qρ´ pN ´ 2qαδiCi,ipA, D¯, β, t¯,x 0qs .
In particular, we observe from the non-decreasing property of marginal utilities (recall
Lemma 3.2), that for all i P N ,
ρ` αδirCi,kp¨q ´ Ci,ip¨qspA, D¯, β, t¯,x 0q ě 0@ k P N , k ‰ i, and ρ´ αδiCi,ipA, D¯, β, t¯,x 0q ě 0 .
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Finally, after appealing to Equation (3.8) and Equation (A-11), we obtainÿ
iPN
ΠipD¯i, D¯´iq “
ÿ
iPN
UipD¯i, D¯´iq ´ ρ1J
ÿ
iPN
D¯i1
“ ´ 1
2pN ´ 1qβt¯p1´ αq
ÿ
iPN
ÿ
k,`PN
k‰`
BUip¨, D¯´iq
Bditk,`u
pD¯iq ´ ρ1J
ÿ
iPN
D¯i1
ě ´ 1
2βt¯p1´ αq
«
N2ρ` pN ´ 2qαpN ´ 1q
ÿ
iPN
Kipδi, A, D¯, D¯, β, t¯,x 0q
ff
´ ρ1J
ÿ
iPN
D¯i1 .
Appealing to Equation (A-6) and Equation (4.3), the result follows.
Proof. [of Proposition 4.7] According to Example 4.1, under the holding assump-
tions, Dˇ is a local Homogeneous Interior Equilibrium which yields an equilibrium net-
work of the form given by Identity (4.2). More precisely, for all distinct i, k, ` P N ,
BUip¨, Dˇ´iq
Bditi,`u
pDˇiq “ δβt¯α p2χphq ´ expp´hqq “ ρ and BUip¨, Dˇ
´iq
Bditk,`u
pDˇiq “ ρ´ δβt¯α expp´hq .
In particular, it follows from the non-decreasing property of marginal utilities (recall
Lemma 3.2) that ρ´ δβt¯α expp´hq ě 0. It is then straightforward to check thatÿ
iPN
ΠipDˇi, Dˇ´iq “ ´ N
2ρ
2βt¯p1´ αq `
NpN ´ 2qδα expp´hq
2p1´ αq ´ ρ1
J ÿ
iPN
Dˇi1 .
On the other hand, one can assume without loss of generality that Dˆ is of the form
Dˆ :“
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˝
0 dˆ . . . dˆ
dˆ
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . dˆ
dˆ . . . dˆ 0
‹˛‹‹‹‹‚ , for some dˆ ě 0 .
Indeed, by concavity of Πˆ, we know the set of Social Optima is convex. Moreover, given
the symmetry of the game, the set of Social Optima shall be invariant by permutation.
Thus, the average of all socially optimal profiles is socially optimal and must be sym-
metric, i.e. of the form Dˆ. The proof is thus concluded proceeding as in the proof of
Theorem 4.1 to prove Equation (A-6), and recalling Equation (4.4).
Proof. [of Proposition 4.8] Let us first remark that in the case where 2δβt¯α ě ρ,
one can check that Dˆ “ A is a Social Optimum. This amounts to saying that CpA, 0q
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is optimal and thus allows to conclude. We now consider the case where 2δβt¯α ă ρ.
One can easily check that for every t¯ ą 0 one can find 2δβt¯α ă ρ ď 2δβt¯α exppβt¯p1 ´
αq ˆminiPN řkPN ai,kq such that there exists 0 ă κ¯ ď miniPN řkPN ai,k satisfying
2δβt¯α exppβt¯p1´ αqκ¯q “ ρ . (A-12)
Let us then recall that for any κ ě 0, and k, ` P N ,
BΠˆ
Bdtk,`u pA´CpA, κqq “
ÿ
iPN
δβt¯α exp pβt¯p1´ αqCpA, κqqi,k`
ÿ
iPN
δβt¯α exp pβt¯p1´ αqCpA, κqqi,`´ρ .
Now, it is straightforward to check that, for κ ą 0, the largest eigenvalue of βt¯p1 ´
αqCpA, κq is µ1 :“ βt¯p1´αqκ. According to the Perron-Frobenius theorem, this largest
eigenvalue is simple. Furthermore, the associated normalised eigenvector is v “ p1{?Nq1.
Thus, applying Lemma 3.1, one gets
exp pβt¯p1´ αqCpA, κqq “ exppβt¯p1´ αqκqV p1`O pexpp´|µ1 ´ µ2|qqq ,
where V :“ vvJ and µ2 denotes the second largest eigenvalue in module.
One shall then notice that for all i, j P N , pV qi,j “ 1{N, so that
BΠˆ
Bdtk,`u pA´ CpA, κqq “ 2δβt¯α exppβt¯p1´ αqκq p1`O pexpp´|µ1 ´ µ2|qqq ´ ρ .
Noting that, all the other parameters being fixed, the spectral gap |µ1´µ2| is increasing
with respect to t¯ and κ, one can assume that for every ε ą 0, there exists T¯ ą 0 such
that for t¯ ě T¯ ,
2δβt¯α exppβt¯p1´ αqκq p1`O pexpp´|µ1 ´ µ2|qqq ď 2δβt¯α exppβt¯p1´ αqκq ` ε{}A} ,
for all κ ą 0. Combining the latter with Equation (A-12), one concludes that CpA, κ¯q
is an approximate critical point in the sense that for all tk, `u P E ,ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ BΠˆBdtk,`u pA´ CpA, κ¯qq
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ ď ε{}A} . (A-13)
Furthermore, if Dˆ denotes the Social Optimum, one has by construction
}A´ CpA, κ¯q ´ Dˆ} ď }A} . (A-14)
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Now, Πˆ being continuous and differentiable, one gets through the mean value theorem
|ΠˆpA´ CpA, κ¯qq ´ ΠˆpDˆq| ď
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ BΠˆBdtk,`u pA´ CpA, κ¯qq
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇˆ }A´ CpA, κ¯q ´ Dˆ} ,
leading, using Equations (A-13) and (A-14), to the required result
|ΠˆpA´ CpA, κ¯qq ´ ΠˆpDˆq| ď ε .
Proof. [of Proposition 5.1] We assume without loss of generality that i “ 1. By
concavity of Π1 the set of local optima is convex. Moreover, given the asymmetry of
the game (involving only player 1), the set of local optima shall be invariant by the
permutation of nodes leaving node 1 invariant. Thus, the average of all locally optimal
profiles is locally optimal. We let D¯ be such optimum. It is, in particular, such that
there exists h P r0, as such that for all 1 ă j ď N, d¯1,j “ d¯j,1 “ h. For 1 ď j ď N,
C1,jpA, D¯, β, t¯,x 0q is of the form
δ1βt¯αpexppH¯qq1,j ,
where H¯ writes
H¯ :“
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˝˚˚
0 µ . . . . . . µ
µ
. . . 0 . . . 0
... 0
. . .
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
µ 0 . . . 0 0
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‹‹‚
with µ :“ βt¯p1´ αqpa´ hq .
Using a Taylor expansion, we obtain that
pexppH¯qq1,1 “
ÿ
kě0
1
2k!
pN ´ 1qkµ2k “ coshp?N ´ 1µq ,
while for 1 ă j ď N,
pexppH¯qq1,j “
ÿ
kě0
1
p2k ` 1q!pN ´ 1q
kµ2k`1 “ sinhp
?
N ´ 1µq?
N ´ 1 .
Hence, in view of the assumption on ρ, D¯ is an Homogeneous Interior Equilibrium.
Moreover, global strategies dominate local ones if and only if for some 1 ă j ď N,
C1,jpA, D¯, β, t¯,x 0q ą C1,1pA, D¯, β, t¯,x 0q and thus if
sinhp?N ´ 1µq ą ?N ´ 1 coshp?N ´ 1µq .
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